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Abstract: Work - its availability, quality and conditions - is a major deter-
minant of psychic and somatic health. Health in turn is a prominent social 
good that tends to be unequally distributed in the population in function of 
its accessibility and the conditions of its social production. Its evolution de-
pends, among other things, on the evolution of work. This sketch starts with 
a short recall of some aspects of our socio-economic system’s meso- and mac-
ro-history, distinguishes three models of macro-economic organization that 
coexist unequally in present-day industrialized countries, and finally zooms 
in on some aspects of work organization and worker qualification. Although 
it focuses on work and some of its economic conditions, its approach will be 
mainly sociological. 
 
Economic expansionism and counter-tendencies 
The actual world-wide economic system developed in Europe over several cen-
turies, in fact since the end of the Middle Ages (Braudel 1973, Wallerstein 1974, 
1980, 1989). It has come to place profit-seeking at the core of its functioning - 
profit-seeking being here defined in rather narrow monetary terms - and en-
genders an ever increasing exploitation of any resources that prove to be in-
strumental in that perspective. The notion of resources or productive factors 
has long been defined in too restricted a sense, meaning mainly natural re-
sources, work and capital. Looking at what is really going on in economic de-
velopment, we realize that nature and culture in these terms’ broadest sense are 
part of the resources progressively put to use and exploited by the economy. 
Seen that way, the actual ecological problems prove to be a direct consequence 
of the working of a narrow, but expansive principle of economic rationality. 
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The Bible can be cited to justify a dominating and exploiting relationship be-
tween man and nature just as Marxist and other conceptions - it is part of the 
basic assumptions of our occidental culture. 
To consider nature as an economic resource has little to astonish, even if we 
have been accustomed for quite a long time to look at it - excuse the image - as 
a baby looks to mother: you take everything you get, without even thinking 
about where it comes from or about giving back something in exchange. 
To consider culture as a resource to be exploited for economic goals is a more 
recent conception, not only in recent managerial doctrines about the culture of 
the firm, but in the more general sense of exploiting workers’ skills and motiva-
tion - not only their “working force”. Lutz (1989), a German sociologist,  has 
shown that from the outset of industrialization, our economy has been living on 
a motivational resource that it does little, if anything, to reproduce. This re-
source is not natural as most others, but cultural. It is the work ethics that devel-
oped in pre-industrial periods and was well attuned to pre-industrial modes of 
production. Since the very beginning of industrialization, the modern factories 
have been recruiting their labour force largely from the traditional sector, i.e. 
from the world of small farms, craft workshops, commerce and other tradition-
al services. It is traditional in the sense that it corresponds to what we may call, 
according to some anthropologists, the domestic mode of production (Sahlins 
1972, Medick 1977). Its guiding principle is not to produce and sell as much as 
possible with as little cost as possible, but to satisfy in an optimum way the 
basic needs of the household and its members (working harder in hard times, 
and less in good times). This traditional sector relies on a generalistic quali-
fication of the economic actors, especially of the small independent ones, that is 
executed in combination with a degree of autonomy and responsibility much 
larger than what is usual for most workers’ or employee’s jobs in modern facto-
ries or administrations. Such capacities are not just handed down by tradition, 
hear-say and explicit teaching; their practical exercise is probably even more 
important for effective learning. We can say that during the process of industri-
alization (and in some countries until very recently), the modernizing economy 
eliminated the very traditional structures whose motivational outcomes it used 
extensively. 
The submission of an increasing part of social life under the needs of the econ-
omy can be seen as part of this economy becoming increasingly disembedded 
(Polanyi 1944), i.e. released from the social constraints existing in traditional 
societies. (Wallerstein (1974) proposes to see in Charles the Great's failure to 
establish a European Empire the historical explanation of capitalism developing 
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in Europe but in no other great feudal system. According to this author, only in 
Europe a large scale economic tissue developed that was not co-extensive with 
an equally wide-ranging polity.) 
So in a way our market economy tends to have the same relationship to nature 
and to culture (or motivation): it exploits them as if they where resources that 
need no special effort to be reproduced. In fact most propositions aimed at di-
minishing some of the present ecological destruction have in common the idea 
to at least begin to internalize into the economic system the heretofore neglected 
function of reproducing the resources on which it lives (e.g., introduce ecologi-
cal and social accounting and corresponding charges). 
 
 
Models of production 
The economic development of Western societies during the 20th century has 
been closely related to a specific form of production. It is not sufficiently well 
identified by the general label of capitalism. Moreover, it is not only made up of 
taylorism and its subsequent, more humanized versions, but of what some eco-
nomic historians call fordism, i.e., the profitable combination of large-scale pro-
duction with high-wage politics assuring mass consumption. We can call it a 
factual keynesianism (steering the business cycle mainly by influencing the 
demand-side of the economic process through income policies and state pur-
chases); it can be state-administered, private or mixed (Piore & Sabel 1984, 
Coombs 1989). 
Taylorism or Scientific Management designs a technique of breaking down, on 
the basis of systematic observation and testing, complex production processes 
into small bits of action needing no specific qualification and allowing for large 
scale standardized mass production. It has been developed by the American 
engineer Frederick R. Taylor at the beginning of the 20th century and had 
quickly been given an additional impetus by its combination with the mecha-
nized production chain. 
There is a number of indicators pointing to the possibility that the fordist model 
is presently attaining some internal limits to its further growth, and that it is 
producing negative side-effects that may contribute to its discredit. Let me first 
refer to the growing difficulties to motivate workers sufficiently, that happen at the 
very moment when the technologies applied make firms more dependent on 
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such motivation than before. High fluctuation rates despite considerable extrin-
sic incentives (wages, individualized time arrangements, various material and 
organizational advantages offered by the firm), absenteeism of persons absent 
and present, high rates of errors and reparations needed before the product 
leaves the factory often speak a clear language. Very similar symptoms exist in 
the service sector. 
Another internal limit to the continuation of fordism is the increasing instability 
due to large scale integration of economic processes, of which the multinationali-
zation of large corporations is only the most visible form. To the extent that 
there is close interdependence of subunits within a highly integrated system (be 
it a firm, an economic sector, a nation or even the economy on a world scale), 
any local turbulence will have excellent chances to spread to the other regions 
by systemic transfer (Perrow 1984). Booms as well as crises are thus blown up 
to the largest level, as the 1987 stock exchange crash has demonstrated. (In this 
particularly rapid case of a self-reinforcing escalation the systemic effects have 
been essentially supported by automatic, computerized portfolio management.) 
A third indication of internal limits may be seen in the increasing resistance, op-
posed mainly by business and by conservative politicians against keynesian-
ism, the welfare state and state intervention in general. 
There are several attempts at overcoming the limits to further fordist pro-
duction: work reorganization in order to increase intrinsic motivation; hierarchy 
reduction; the reorganization of the relationships between subunits in order to 
create decentralized instead of centralized integration; and the insertion of buffer 
functions against the above-mentioned systemic effects of turbulence propaga-
tion. Nevertheless, debate on such experiments by far outweighs real experi-
ences (for working examples on a regional scale see again Piore & Sabel 1984), 
so I think that we are only at the beginning of a period of practical exploration. 
For the time being, only few large corporations seem to be inclined to try such 
experiments. The sector of small and medium sized firms is even more reluc-
tant. 
Reproduction of Nature, reproduction of Culture, the internal limits to the ford-
ist model and the attempts to overcome them will be among the main parame-
ters shaping the questions of interest. We may be faced with the problems they 
create at a faster or slower pace and in a different order than some have pre-
dicted. The reasons for believing in the possibility of delay lie in the present 
attempts and opportunities to overcome or extend the limits to fordism. Espe-
cially and first, despite some phenomena of over-production, market expansion 
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will be still further developed, both internally and externally. External expansion 
refers to the development of new markets - we are just at the beginning of the 
opening up of Eastern Europe to the market economy, a bargain for putting to 
use the productive and investive overkill of the Western economic apparatus; 
the yet unconquered immensity of China looms behind, and also other devel-
oping parts of the Third World. Internal expansion refers to the integration of 
still other functions and services, up to now produced and exchanged in non-
market relationships, into the monetarized commodity circuit. This alters the 
conditions under which people can have access to them and the social relation-
ships into which they are traditionally embedded. I am thinking especially of 
all kinds of body and soul caring (think of all sorts of individual and group the-
rapy, sensitivity training etc.), but include also leisure, the acquisition of 
knowledge and skills,  and many kinds of counselling. We have probably not 
yet reached the point of maximal care-taking by professionals against money - 
for those who can afford it, of course. Habermas (1981) has called this process 
the colonization of everyday life. 
Another strategy of expansion is speeding up the consumption cycle. As its eco-
nomic importance and undesirable side effects (especially in ecological terms) 
are probably underestimated, it must at least be mentioned. This refers to the 
artificial shortening of the product life cycle by planned obsolescence of hard-
ware, software and symbolic status. (The latter goes largely unobserved, but is 
of great importance. We can call this “fashion” in the largest sense of the term, 
with respect to consumer goods, but also in other market sectors. One of the 
more recent examples is the rapid succession of improved versions of computer 
software, creating the need for more hardware capacity, which facilitates the 
use of still better programs, which run better on the more recent computer 
model, for which even more potent software exists, etc.) 
Beside expansion, a second strategy to maintain economic dynamics without 
questioning its basic model is automation, today mainly based on computers, 
robots and telecommunication. This strategy aims directly at replacing human 
work by machine work in order to diminish costs. There are still more strate-
gies that may permit firms to diminish their costs: 3. dualizing the labour force 
into a stable and a precarious segment, the latter working under bad conditions 
in function of short-term economic fluctuations; 4. the transfer of labour inten-
sive operations to low-wage countries, and 5. the delegation of high-cost and 
low-profit production or service functions to the clients. We can already ob-
serve a (little studied) rise of consumption work, e.g., with telebanking and 
pay-cards, that transfers the costly function of data entry onto the clients. In a 
similar vein, you may also think of the mushrooming sector of do-it-yourself. 
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Some analysts speak of the Black-and-Decker or Ikea syndrome to design the 
double aspect of an expanding and profitable market and a new category of 
private activity. We still think of ourselves as customers buying goods and ser-
vices, but we are already on the way to become consumption workers. 
This means that the actual phase of economic development has contradictory 
effects: on the one hand, market forces and their logic continue to subdue fur-
ther territories and functional sectors that have so far remained external to 
them, but on the other hand they create a fringe of non-market activities (so-
called grey markets or informal economic activities, often on the basis of mon-
eyless barter and of course without taxes or social insurance payments) that are 
linked to their functioning, but escape legal regulation and institutional control. 
This may turn out to be a surprising, unintentional contribution to the realm of 
informal and alternative economic activity, a realm that is otherwise fuelled by 
ideological commitment (or by unlawful practices). Increasing commodification 
is thus accompanied to some extent by increasing de-institutionalization and 
demonetarization. This tendency expresses above all a rationalizing strategy by 
profit-seeking firms, but also a growing popular desire to reappropriate func-
tions of social life, actually taken care of by market processes, institutional regu-
lations and their inherent constraints. This is a counter-tendency to the increas-
ing colonization of everyday life as diagnosed by Habermas (1981). 
Owing to this situation, we are heading toward a period of increasing diversity 
rather than of a unifying master-trend, diversity of all aspects of economic life, 
especially of the underlying models of production. Which models? We may say 
that today the fordist model is predominant, be it on the factual level or only as 
an aspiration: large-scale integrated mass production for wage-encouraged 
mass consumption. At the other extreme, we have a small, but interesting mi-
nority practicing “alternative production”, giving as much or even more im-
portance to workers' self-determination and to ecological compatibility than to 
productivity and wages. While the fordist model has been, at least in economic 
terms, extremely successful during this century, the alternative model has had 
enormous difficulties to get stabilized in the long run under acceptable condi-
tions. It subsists on the margin of industrialized countries and enjoys little ex-
pansion if any. There is still another, third model, sometimes blending in with 
the second: the traditional model of the small firm, owned and directed by an 
independent craftsman, merchant or professional who is often integrated, eco-
nomically and socially, into the local or regional networks. All three models 
will continue to exist, but there will be other ones tried out as well. Needless to 
say that problems of work organization heavily depend on these models. (Let 
us think of just one example: just-in-time production. How would its generali-
- 7 - 
zation affect work organization and worker lives? It would most probably im-
pose much more flexibility in work schedules, with ensuing problems for the 
synchronization of various social rhythms, e.g., of school life, associational and 
political life, consumption and leisure.) However, this diversity will be rather 
qualitative than quantitative, as there are presently no effective forces running 
against the on-going globalization of the dominant model of production. 
 
Social structure 
Even if the overall trend of industrial and post-industrial development is corre-
lated to (and facilitated by) progressive reduction of social constraints on the 
economy, it still takes place in the framework of human societies; the men and 
women who work in it do also participate in the life of other social sectors. So 
let us briefly and very sketchily look at social change outside the economy, es-
pecially at social stratification in highly developed countries. Sociologists define 
stratification as the system of social inequalities within a society. Recent re-
search and interpretations seem to converge on one overall tendency: in mod-
ern, especially highly industrialized or even post-industrialized societies, the 
main social inequalities do not diminish, but they become more independent of each 
other. In sociological jargon one would say that the crystallization of the stratifi-
cation system diminishes, which means that social boundaries become blurred, 
that classes become less identifiable. In other words: according to the different 
criteria that constitute the stratification system, e.g., income, formal education, 
occupational position, people continue to be located at very different levels, but 
one and the same person may be differently positioned according to the criteri-
on considered. 
What are the likely consequences of de-crystallization? The main consequence 
is increasing individualization, mainly not on an ideological, but on a social-
structural basis, i.e. it concerns the social order itself and not social representa-
tions in the first place (Beck 1986). As people are differently integrated in socie-
ty and its substructures, they make social experiences that singularize them; 
they will find it increasingly difficult to recognize themselves in the experiences 
made by others; thinking in individual rather than collective terms will become 
increasingly plausible. Social structure becomes invisible; society becomes less 
transparent and less real to its members. Its global outline disappears behind the 
multiplicity of its constituent elements, and a crucial basis for solidarity gets 
decomposed. 
Another consequence of structural individualization is probably the value 
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change that has set in since the beginning of the 70s. Several studies show a shift 
from materialist to post-materialist values, giving less priority to issues of material 
well-being and security and more to themes like self-realization, sociability, 
spirituality (Inglehart 1971, 1990). 
Structural and cultural individualization have to be taken into account - not 
only in politics, but also in economic strategies that aim at overcoming the ob-
stacles to further expansion of the fordist model. New technologies play a criti-
cal role in such strategies; we shall presently have a closer look at their social 
meaning. 
A second major trend, likely to be reinforced by the first one, is the growing gap 
between everyday life, with its social ties, non-commercial exchanges, individual 
activities and reflexions, and the institutions forming the macrostructure of society. 
The search for autonomy, put forward by the protagonists of the students’ and 
other new social movements in the last twenty years, becomes structurally 
based and transforms into a largely shared social aspiration. The large institu-
tional structures (like the state, firms, the army, the church) do not simply dis-
appear, but their capacity to organize large parts of people’s everyday lives di-
minishes and their social legitimacy may be challenged. (By legitimacy we 
mean the social acceptation of a hierarchy, of an unequal distribution of a val-
ued good such as income, of a powerful social actor by those who find them-
selves in a weak position.) We may even speculate that if this gap is to grow to 
a substantial degree, it might become a major social tension and lead to im-
portant institutional rearrangements. The changes under way in the East, but 
also to some extent the construction of a more integrated Europe are of that 
kind. 
 
New technologies and work organization 
The new technologies, especially the information technologies, are basically 
ambivalent (Coriat 1990). They may be introduced into existing structures ac-
cording to an exclusively technocratic logic (T), or their introduction can be the 
occasion of reorganization (S+T).  
In the first case, the T-strategy, they are likely to continue and reinforce the in-
herent negative tendencies of the taylorist or post-taylorist work organization. 
They will contribute, among others, to the exclusion of humane work (and of-
ten of human work altogether) from the workshop and the office and will do 
little to avoid the limits of the fordist model in the long run. The T-strategy of 
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technology introduction is bound to deepen the polarization between physical 
and mental work, and probably often also the one between the category of 
highly and intrinsically motivated stable workers on the one hand and the one 
of poorly, extrinsically motivated “marginal” workers on the other. All of these 
consequences are bound to negatively affect not only the quality of life at work, 
but also productivity. 
In the second case, the S+T-strategy, the new technologies can support new 
modes of organization, more flexible, decentralized and less hierarchic, that 
focus on self-organization, qualification and responsibility, allow for more flex-
ibility of the firm as a whole and maybe even for the construction of regional 
networks that can become alternatives to world-wide-integrated firms (Piore & 
Sabel 1984). 
To realize this second possibility calls for the socio-technical systems approach 
(Herbst 1974; Ulich et al. 1989). This approach considers the technical and the 
social subsystem of a work organization as two parts to be integrated with each 
other. They cannot be optimized alone, but only together, one-sidedness in one 
or the other direction creating disturbances in the functioning of the whole. 
The choice between the T-strategy and the S+T-strategy is fundamental for the 
quality of life at work. Which choice is finally made seems rarely prede-
termined by technical constraints. It depends largely on how the main actors con-
front the issues of work and firm organization. The choice is basically not of a tech-
nical, but of a political kind. Actually, an increasing number of firms is taking 
into account what is referred to rather prudishly as the human factor; I think 
that due to the problems inherent to the fordist model, this concern is bound to 
stay with us ever more seriously.   
A master concept coming along with these technologies is flexibility. Temporal 
and spatial flexibility of work are as ambivalent as the more structural or or-
ganizational aspects I have already pointed to; it can be just another instrument 
of increasing productivity at the expense of workers, or it can be a management 
philosophy integrating their aspirations into the goals of the firm. 
Flexible time may concern different aspects and organizational levels: the distri-
bution of the global volume of work on all the persons seeking employment 
(decrease of individual work time proportional to increases in productivity and 
to mechanization of tasks), but also its variable distribution over the personal 
life cycle, the year, the week according to various formulae.  
Favoured by telecommunications and the compacting of various work equip-
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ments, flexible place might concern an increasing number of people, far beyond 
of those occupations that have traditionally been working on varying sites.  
Flexible time is increasingly experimented, but some forms are much more 
popular than other ones. One important dividing line seems to be whether the 
formula responds only to the employer’s interests or also to those of the em-
ployees. Flexible place is rarely practiced; many firms who do have the choice 
refrain from giving out pieces and information, e.g., to so-called satellite offices, 
ostensibly fearing a loss of control (Olson 1989). 
Still another form of flexibility concerns the technical system used: flexible pro-
duction. These systems - in production as in the services, e.g., travel or-
ganization) - tend to become increasingly multi-functional and geared toward 
just-in-time treatment of incoming orders, which means to combine the tech-
nical and economical advantages of mass production with the heightened value 
of à-la-carte products. Providing a high level of qualification of their collabora-
tors, this possibility could be a bargain for small and medium-sized firms as it 
helps to bring down production costs while maintaining an individualized ser-
vice to the customer (Ulich et al. 1989). 
The first option - enhancing productivity by purely technological measures - 
can be successful in the short range, postponing its negative side-effects. In the 
middle and long range, the second option is likely to prove economically supe-
rior. The problem is that management action seems to be mainly and increas-
ingly conceived in the short range only. 
 
Qualification of the work-force 
At the risk of repeating well-known things, it is in place here to take up some 
considerations about qualification demands of working men and women as a 
function of the new technologies, especially if their introduction is not accom-
panied by changes of the organization and the overall conception of work. This 
will allow us to see on a more practical level the differences between a purely 
technical and an integrated socio-technic strategy of work reorganization: 
Work is becoming more abstract. Direct manipulation of physical objects is being 
replaced by manipulation of symbols and informations; the worker becomes a 
steering agent of complex machines. This results in a very different mobiliza-
tion of human capacities than was the case by traditional forms of work. This 
concerns again production as well as a large segment of the services, where part 
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of direct relational work with clients is being rationalized, i.e. transferred to 
machines. For instance, face-to-face activities, traditionally linked to infor-
mation exchange of all kind are replaced by multiplier activities, permitting a 
single employee, civil servant, counselling agent, etc., to respond to a higher 
number of recipients whom he or she no longer meets, but contacts by way of 
intervening technical media. In the same vein, information entry is increasingly 
no longer performed in direct interaction, but by the clients' technical manipu-
lation (card-paying etc.). To the extent to which this change takes place, persons 
with a more traditional profile of capacities (manual or social skills) will find 
more difficulties to get interesting jobs and risk decreasing quality of life at 
work. This kind of problem is likely to fall especially on women as their rela-
tional skills may find fewer fields of professional utility. This tendency could be 
countered by the heightened attention some firms begin to pay to their interface 
with customers, seeking to come back from mass marketing to personalized 
contacts. 
The systems, especially the software used by the new technologies change rapidly, their 
longevity is brought down to very short intervals. This accelerated rhythm of 
change entails the necessity of frequent adaptations of the know-how and skills 
involved in handling these systems. Mastering the work instrument is less and 
less a definitively acquired asset, reorientation becomes an important capacity 
in itself, both for the workers and for the management. Recurrent education, 
the necessary capacities and motivation become a compulsory prerequisite for 
staying on the job. Cognitive flexibility becomes a major plus. However, there 
may be some exaggeration as to the diminished value presently attributed to 
personal experience, part of which probably remains a precious cultural capital 
for those firms that succeed in putting it to use. 
The new systems are of an increasingly flexible application. Their handling demands 
cognitive functioning on higher levels of abstraction than is the case of more 
traditional work skills. Professional excellence will concern more the mastery of 
instrumental information than the virtuosity of execution. The comments to my 
first point are applicable again. 
The flexibility and multi-functionality of the technical systems is based on a transfer of 
technical knowledge from the workers to the machines, a trend particularly conspic-
uous in the case of expert systems. Eventually, due to such systems, profession-
al functions or even entire professions may become obsolete, even those taken 
until recently to be un-rationalizable, especially those implying the mastering 
of large sets of factual information (take medical diagnosis or the profession of 
pharmacist). Among the consequences of the diffusion of such innovations 
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there could be considerable conflict involving vested interests, especially if tra-
ditionally privileged professions are concerned. More generally, this may be-
come a major factor of dehumanizing the work place with all the ensuing prob-
lems for the firm and the larger social community. The alternative would be a 
fundamental reorientation toward more integrated, holistic forms of work or-
ganization 
Computerized data processing allows to dissociate the functions of execution and con-
trol much more than previous technologies. On purely technical grounds, decentral-
ized work (individual work stations that may be located at very distant places) 
can easily be combined with centralized control. Thus it is possible to increase 
the social control of individual workers while diminishing their capacity to or-
ganize and to develop collective action. After a prolonged period of relative 
stability, this may become one element of a basic challenge to the actual state of 
industrial relations. At the time being, its impact is attenuated by the resistanc-
es against the most pronounced forms of telework. Moreover, it is by no means 
evident that isolated workers work better than teams. 
While diminishing the risks of physical harm by work accidents, the introduction of 
new technologies engenders further intensification of work, often also social isolation 
and uneven demands on human skills. Apart from (and parallel to) the problems 
related to shift work, there is a real risk that instead of eliminating the negative 
effects of work (such as specific morbidity and mortality), these technologies 
transfer disturbances from the purely somatic to the psychosomatic and psy-
chosocial level. Such problems are more diffuse, less evident to identify, less 
easily attributable to their origin, and more difficult to treat. 
This list is certainly incomplete, but let me stop here. It may seem unilateral as 
it features the negative consequences of introducing new technologies and es-
pecially of their introducing according to a one-sidedly technical conception. 
This is not the result of ideological partisanship, but of a rather sceptical look at 
the forces behind the actual processes of technological diffusion. Most of these 
technologies are capital-devouring and serve to save manpower costs, which 
means that management puts them to use primarily to rapidly achieve high 
productivity with low labour cost and quick redemption of the invested capital, 
and only secondarily (if at all) to reorganize and humanize work. This one-
sided logic is likely to prevail as long as labour unions do not effectively inter-
fere with it, and as long as its negative economic side-effects will not be clearly 
singled out by current accounting procedures. 
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Value change and work 
We should look into still another element of change that has already been men-
tioned: the change of values, mainly among the younger generations (Inglehart 
1971). This change is generally analyzed as a shift from materialist to post-
materialist values, giving less priority to issues of material well-being and securi-
ty and more to themes like self-realization, sociability and spirituality. Such a 
change seems really to take place, but it would certainly be wrong to think of it 
in terms of a general and progressive decline of the materialist values. It is a 
change of priorities. 
Among the so-called materialist values we also find work. What is being ques-
tioned is not so much work as a social value but the formalist (bourgeois, 
protestant, materialist...) conception valuing work in itself, whatever its con-
tent. The value change implies not a general decrease of the interest in work, 
but a more demanding attitude that could be expressed by the phrase: either I 
get interesting work, then I’m prepared to identify with it, or I just get a well-
paying job, then don’t ask me for any personal commitment.  
There are, however, good reasons to believe that such a value change will hard-
ly spill over some very basic barriers inherent in the social order. These are set 
by the way exchange is institutionalized in our societies. The main institutional 
form of exchange is the market mechanism. It makes it impossible for most 
people to survive physically and socially without buying goods and services 
with money they must earn by working. It is not before this structural link will 
be weakened that such a value change can be expected to motivate behavioural 
change on a significant scale, unless the power balance on the labour market 
moves enough in favour of the employees to permit them to be qualitatively 
selective. The guarantied basic income would be a mechanism that could break 
the structural link giving its central role to work in present societies (Schmid 
1984, GRAEL 1986). 
An intriguing thing about this value change is that it seems to be rather closely 
correlated with economic development: it has gone farthest in the richest coun-
tries and is weakest in the poor countries (Inglehart 1979). This suggests that 
the questioning of materialist values may be directly linked to a high level of 
their realization (or of their perceived realisability). In simpler terms: as long as 
a population does not enjoy a fair level of material well-being, its achievement 
remains an unquestioned priority. Only when you are sure you can get what 
you consider important, you start looking out for something else that you 
would like to get as well. The rise of post-materialist values being tied to interna-
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tional inequality indicates that this case of value-substitution must be seen as a 
luxury by countries and populations who are struggling for material well-being 
on a substantially lower level. We should, in this respect, not only think of 
Third World countries, but also of those of the Second, i.e. the Eastern World. 
Most of them are under way to fully integrate themselves into the international 
system built around the social value of socio-economic development, in other 
terms around the very materialist values that start being challenged in those 
countries that are most privileged in respect to them. In this international per-
spective, one could ask whether the quality-of-life debate in the rich countries 
of the globe has not a subterranean dimension of neo-feudalism supporting it. 
That value change, if it becomes effective on a societal level, adds a new criteri-
on to the bundle of international inequalities, concerning which it is still more 
difficult to move upward than with respect to the other ones. 
In the rich countries, there may be another, structural force that undermines the 
centrality of work as a social value. I am thinking of the enormous effort at sub-
stituting human labour by automated machine work, especially in the form of com-
puter integrated manufacturing (CIM). The dream of the unmanned factory 
appears to many as a promising strategy to get rid of rising wage costs, human 
errors, the unpredictable labour market and unruly labour unions. Practical 
examples are being tested. For some reasons, it can be doubted whether this 
concept will really prove to be economically rational. But however this question 
may be answered, such a perspective is a novel challenge to our valuing work 
as a basic human capacity and activity. Christian, liberal-economic and Marxist 
conceptions all share the conviction that work has an essential anthropological 
significance. Current studies on unemployment support this view.1 If economic 
values can be produced without human work, the social value of work risks to 
be shattered fatally, as it no longer appears to be a necessary condition of life.  
The technical possibility of human work becoming largely superfluous can be 
seen as a promise of hell or of paradise - whatever it be, it leads to rather basic 
questions: 
- Is it still sensible to think that values, especially economical ones, can only be 
created by human work? 
- Is it actually true that we are significant beings mainly by virtue of our eco-
nomic activity? 
- If ever we get at a point where large parts of the economy no longer need hu-
man labour - what will then guarantee the sheer existence of human beings? 
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- If a post-work society becomes thinkable, we should also start to figure out 
around what values and structures such a society might be organized. 
Once we start examining these questions, some quite fundamental elements of 
our social order begin to require rethinking. But for the time being, it is only the 
small, privileged part of the world’s Northwest that is concerned by such con-
siderations. So we should briefly come back go a more global perspective. 
 
A look at the international system 
While many promising social experiments are being tried out on a local scale, 
especially in the countries of Northern Europe and North America, the econo-
my has become global. Multinational corporations (MNCs) are now a major 
element of the international social structure. Between half and three quarters of 
all international exchanges are estimated to have by now become intra-
corporation exchanges (Beaud 1987), allowing, among others, for hidden, large 
scale capital transfers difficult to control by national agencies. MNCs are pow-
erful collective actors, organizing a large and increasing part of the available 
work places all over the world. Compared to polities, their action is subject to 
considerably fewer constraints: they are much less bound to a particular territo-
ry, can easily navigate among national contexts and their specific political and 
legal constraints, and are often weighty negotiators, especially when faced by 
governments of economically and politically weak regions or countries. 
The rise of MNCs as powerful economic actors on a global level takes place in a 
period of stagnating intergovernmental structures. It thus appears to be still 
another step in the above-mentioned process of the economy’s social dis-
embedding (Polanyi 1944). While even middle and small firms start to go inter-
national, polities remain national. Even if the global stalemate between the su-
perpowers has become fluid with the disintegration of the Soviet system, no 
functional equivalent of a government with regulated input and output struc-
tures and implementation power is taking shape on the international level 
(even if the intervening capacity of the UNO has increased somewhat). Polities 
and firms may have common features. There is at least one important differ-
ence that is of interest: polities, at least democratic ones, provide more regularly 
for political input and some form of democratic control of their functioning and 
priorities than firms. Even if the latter have to respond to the market, they are 
hardly ever faced with an organized opponent that would act as for instance 
political parties or interest groups do. This difference applies not only to the 
material or symbolic goods they sell, but also to the working conditions they 
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offer. Up to now, attempts at developing international labour unions that 
would become effective counterparts to the MNCs have had only limited suc-
cess. Moreover, the implantation of MNC branches in Third World countries 
has several disruptive effects on national economies, social conditions and ine-
quality: they create a ghettoized labour aristocracy, dependent subcontractors, 
contribute little or (in the long run) negatively to general development 
(Bornschier & Chase-Dunn 1985), have negative effects on the physical well-
being of the larger population (Wimberley 1990) and reinforce the marginaliza-
tion of the traditional economic sector and the population that is related to it - 
needless to remind that this sector is a much more important part of Third 
World than of European or North American societies, and that its often ne-
glected contribution to national subsistence is crucial to their societies’ devel-
opment. 
The social value of material well-being (to which health in its elementary and 
more elaborate forms belongs as well) is central to the international inequalities 
of development and also to the popular aspirations all over the world. We have 
seen that the value-change in favour of non-materialist values is by far most 
pronounced in the (economically) richest countries of the world. We may con-
sider these international inequalities as a proper stratification system, with na-
tions stratified into classes or rather into structurally defined hierarchical lay-
ers. Low-status populations of low-ranking countries can choose between (or 
combine) two alternative interpretations of their situation: international dis-
crimination of their society as a whole, or internal (class) discrimination (Heintz 
1982). Low-status populations of high-ranking countries may feel little solidari-
ty with the former, since active solidarity implies some form of international 
redistribution and must appear to threaten their own well-being (which they 
rarely see as a privilege as their social reference is not with their structural 
peers in poorer societies, but with the privileged groups in their own societies).  
Up to now, the international system, organized around the value of deve-
lopment under conditions of capitalist or market economies, functioned in par-
allel to a smaller, mostly self-contained international system of socialist econo-
mies, equally stratified on the level of nations, but officially built around values 
of solidarity and equality rather than of increasing well-being. However, the 
latter was not denied, on the contrary. Ever since Stalin the official doctrine of 
the Eastern world has engaged in an explicitly declared competition for well-
being and national economic force with the capitalist West, thus implanting the 
very criterion for these regimes' increasing and eventually exploding illegitima-
cy. The Soviet international system had little interaction with the the capitalist 
system. For good or bad reasons, the legitimacy of the Soviet systems’ internal 
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structures has very quickly faded away, and most of its nation states are striv-
ing to integrate into the first system (where they will at best occupy intermedi-
ate ranks, comparable to Latin American or Southern European countries). On 
the structural level, the first-mentioned international system, characterized by 
few and weak overarching political structures and much leeway for MNCs and 
other forms of economic power, will thus become even more predominant. On 
the cultural level, the socialist project of an alternative social organization is 
now heavily discredited - again irrespective of this being so for good or for bad 
reasons.  
It is not possible at this time to explore in detail hypotheses about the likely 
consequences of this process of system homogenization on a global scale. Neverthe-
less, our brief considerations suggest some arguments to fear that at least for 
some time there will be an increased acceptance of individualistic and self-
blaming ways of responding to economic pressures in many parts of the world 
- with the ensuing bad prospects for health-furthering work reorganization. 
 
What can science do? 
We must recognize that health - work-related and other - is a socially defined, 
produced and unequally distributed good. As such it is interlocked with other 
forms of power and privilege, with their reproduction or transformation. We 
must also recognize that the access any individual has to this good does not 
only depend on his or her personal effort and talent, but also (or even to a larg-
er extent) on the various social conditions under which he or she has to act.  
We have looked into some of the complexities of the structural and cultural 
context, from the meso-social up to the global level of the present world system. 
It is obvious that such complex and multi-layered systems cannot be reduced to 
simple determinisms and exclusive two-variable relationships. They are made 
of multiple, interrelated, vicious and virtuous circles of interdependence. As a 
consequence, no either/or kind of strategy can be likely to produce desired change, but 
only multi-level interventions based on global and complex thinking, even if action 
has to be local. 
As scientists, we have easier access to factual and interpretive knowledge and 
to the possibilities of their diffusion than to the power that is needed to directly 
change social structures. Information can be a source of power and thus become 
a social structure. But it is more prone to directly affect legitimacy, and power 
only indirectly; the countries of Eastern Europe have given a striking example 
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of the regime-shaking effectiveness a fast loss of legitimacy can have. We may 
hypothesize that scientific information can effect desired (or prevent undesired) 
change in social structures if it 
- reinforces the legitimacy of actors who have a real interest to go in the desired 
direction, 
- reduces the legitimacy of actors who pursue adverse interests (i.e. their le-
gitimacy among their constituency, clients or other relevant partners), 
- can open up or structure new situations that are not yet institutionalized and 
where the relevant actors have not yet clearly defined their central issues and 
interests. 
A general strategical principle could then be to pursue activity that 
- aims at changes in institutional functioning, 
- counters ideologies presenting the status quo as being natural, necessary or 
individually and not socially constructed, and 
- encourages forms of self-help, giving support to autonomous organization 
and action, e.g., by giving privileged access to operational information etc.), 
- constructs the necessary informal networks and other instruments for in-
formation exchange that support such activities. 
The area of autonomous organization, non-dependent on centers of power, 
might be an area that can develop at a time in the international North and 
South, and it may be a less conflicting field of intervention for scientists than 
highly institutionalized contexts with their vested resistances against change. 
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1 See, among many others, Jahoda (1982) and Levi (1987). However, there are 
some intriguing exceptions such as those reported in Zoll (1987) or those con-
cerning collective unemployment reported by Osterland (1990). They raise the 
question of how we should define work. Instead of doing it, as usual, above all 
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in an essentialist way, i.e. referring to its intrinsic characteristics, we could con-
sider more important that it is a regular human activity taking place in and 
being shaped by a specific substructure of society, its economic sector, and in 
the framework of this sector’s specific social relations. Its objectively existential 
relevance - various subjective reinterpretations notwithstanding - may result 
not so much from the cultural meaning attached to it than from the work-
>income->survival link which is a central institutional feature of market 
economy societies. We know little about how unemployment, i.e. the absence of 
work for income, is subjectively experienced if this institutional link is weake-
ned or altogether absent on a societal level - except for children, housewifes and 
retired persons. These are categories that are socially defined (not existentially 
and even less genetically “programmed”) as not having to engage in the work 
force. Frequently, the persons belonging to these categories (at least those living 
in the first and second situation) do not seem particularly de-personalized - 
work is legitimately absent from their role set, the mentioned institutional link 
is not relevant to them... 
